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On December 22, 1992, Mexico enacted an unprecedented anti-
trust law regime - the Federal Law of Economic Competition.1
Drafted and promoted by Mexico's leading economists and lawyers,
the new law established a national policy that focuses exclusively on
the promotion of economic efficiency through the competitive
process.'
Vigorously applied, the new competition policy should eliminate
long-standing anticompetitive practices in the Mexican market, such
as market-sharing cartels, exclusive dealing contracts, and collusive
price-fixing arrangements. Mexico's enforcement of the new Compe-
tition Law may also eradicate serious market distortions stemming
from decades of state intervention in numerous sectors of the
economy.
Mexico became a party to the North American Free Trade
Agreement last year.' NAFTA is a trilateral agreement among the
United States, Canada and Mexico that, among other things, phases
out and eventually abolishes trade barriers in North America, creat-
* Partner, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, San Francisco, California. I wish to gratefully
acknowledge the invaluable assistance and suggestions of Albert Moreno, Commissioner Leonel
Pereznieto Castro, Professor Kevin R. Johnson, Robert Doughty and Scott Wiener.
1. Ley Federal de Competencia Economica, D. 0., Dec. 24, 1995. Federal Law of Economic
Competition, Official Gazette of the Federation, Dec. 24, 1995 (english translation) (hereinafter
"LFCE").
2. Id. chpt. 1.
3. The Senate approved the North American Free Trade Agreement by a 61-38 margin on
November 20, 1993. H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 Cong. Rec. S16712-13 (1993) (en-
acted). Previously the House had passed NAFTA in a 234-2 vote. H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., 139 Cong. Rec. H10,048 (1993) (enacted). NAFTA became law when Canada, the United
States and Mexico formally signed the agreement on September 8, 9, and 14, 1993 Mexico City,
Ottowa, and Washington D.C.. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Can.-Mex. (herein
after NAFTA). North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §
3301 et. seq. (West 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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ing a free trade zone of over 360 million consumers." By establishing
a free trade relationship with the United States, Mexico hopes to
improve its trade position with the United States which has histori-
cally been Mexico's largest trading partner. Mexico, in turn, is the
United States' third largest trading partner, after Canada and
Japan.5
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexico, the
United States and Canada are committed to create greater invest-
ment opportunities and to facilitate increased trade in North
America.6 Trade and investment are important to each of the
NAFTA countries; the trade agreement thus seeks to create a more
predictable business climate so as to reduce, or eliminate, much of
the risk associated with foreign investment. By establishing a free
trade relationship with the United States, Mexico hopes to secure a
more favorable commercial position than it has had in the past with
the U.S. The United States is Mexico's largest trade partner, ac-
counting for almost 70 % of total Mexican trade." Mexico, in turn,
is the United States's third largest trade partner, after Canada and
Japan. 8 Mexico is expected to benefit substantially more from the
trade agreement than either the United States or Canada largely
because Mexico's gross domestic product is scarcely 5 % that of the
U.S., and its economy historically has been relatively closed to for-
eign investment.9
NAFTA's Chapter on Competition Policy commits the United
States, Canada, and Mexico to take "appropriate action" to prohibit
anticompetitive business practices. 10 Having recently enacted its
first comprehensive Competition Law regime, Mexico now appears
to have committed itself to insure a competitive environment for
NAFTA-based firms operating in Mexico. The substantial increase
in trade and cross-border investment in North America is likely to
lead to increased interaction and cooperative enforcement among
the NAFTA parties' antitrust authorities.
4. Id.
5. In 1993, U.S. - Mexico trade exceeded U.S. $87 billion, nearly three times larger than the
trade between the two countries in 1986. U.S. EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, THE UNITED STATES AND
MEXICO: A GROWING PARTNERSHIP (ed. 1993).
6. NAFTA, supra note 3.
7. CAROLITA L. OLIVEROS, International Distribution Issues: An Overview of Relevant Laws,
C888 ALI-ABA 553, 576 (1994).
8. id.
9. Id.
10. NAFTA, supra note 3.
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This Article presents an assessment of Mexico's new Competition
Law regime. Part I sets forth the context in which Mexico's first
comprehensive antitrust law was enacted. Part II provides an over-
view of the LFCE: its scope and purpose, its substantive rules and
its enforcement mechanisms. Part III places the LFCE in the con-
text of Mexico's civil law system, and discusses important enforce-
ment and interpretation issues. Part IV explores NAFTA's Compe-
tition Law provisions and the need for coordination of competition
issues in the NAFTA free trade area.
I. OVERVIEW OF MEXICO'S PRIOR ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Mexico's Decades of Statist Economic Policy
With a 3,000 mile border with the United States, Mexico histori-
cally has been subjected to enormous influence - and often direct
control - from its powerful neighbor to the north. As a result, dur-
ing the early decades of this century, Mexico began to take mea-
sures to centralize its resources and political power, and to protect
its economy from foreign exploitation." Mexico pursued centraliza-
tion of resources through expropriation and nationalization.' 2 The
Constitution, drafted during the violent throes of the Mexican
Revolution, declared sub-surface minerals to be the state's inaliena-
ble property and barred foreign ownership of coastal land.' 3 Mexico
also expropriated agrarian landholdings, the oil, sugar, steel indus-
tries, telecommunications and transportation. 4
As important, from the end of the Mexican Revolution until the
early 1980s, political and economic power came to reside in a single
political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional ("PRI")."6
The PRI, self-described as the party of the revolution, has governed
Mexico at the federal, state and local level for over six decades.' 6
11. See BILATERAL COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. - MEXICAN RELATIONS, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE: MEXICO & THE U.S. (1989) (stating that Mexico's nationalistic
economic policies were based on fear of domination by capital from the U.S.).
12. Id.
13. MEX. CONST. art. 28.
14. See Amy H. Goldin, Mexican Labor Law from 3 Perspectives: the Constitution, the Trade
Unions, and the Maquiladoras: Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of Democ-
racy in trade Unions, 11 COmP. LAB. L.J. 203, 203 (1990).
15. Id.
16. The ruling PRI officially has lost only four gubernatorial elections in almost seven decades.
Most recently, the PRI lost the gubernatorial election in one of Mexico's largest states, Jalisco.
Tim Goden, Governing Party in Mexico Suffers Big State Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at
Al, W16. The PRI also lost the mayor's race in the state capital, Guadalajara, Mexico's second
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Although a comprehensive analysis of Mexico's unique political his-
tory is well beyond the scope of this Article, the country's six and
one-half decades of unbroken rule by a single political party has had
at least two profound effects on its economic development that bear
directly on Mexico's present efforts to open the economy to interna-
tional competition. First, the PRI's concentration of political power
came to depend directly on the government's increasing control of
the economy itself.1 7 State dominance over key sectors of the econ-
omy essentially served the political goals of the PRI by ensuring a
vast network of loyalists throughout the Mexican polity. As a result,
the Mexican government came to control - by strict regulation and
direct ownership - literally thousands of business enterprises
throughout the economy.18
Second, and in part because the PRI came to power following a
bloody revolution which put an end to decades of unbridled foreign
domination over the economy, Mexico's economic policies were
designed to manage, and restrict, foreign investment in the national
economy to make Mexico as self-sufficient as possible. Most impor-
tantly, after World War II, Mexico pursued economic growth
through a development model of import substitution, 9 a strategy
which favors the expansion of the internal market, in contrast to
development through "market-driven" primary commodity ex-
ports. 0 Under this model, the Mexican government encouraged and
protected domestic industry, often through direct subsidies, price
supports and the outright exclusion of foreign competition.2 The
"hallmark" of the import substitution policy was to develop national
industry to produce what had formerly been imported. 22
This economic model has been credited for "transforming Mexico
from a backward rural economy into one of the industrial giants of
largest city. Id.
17. Id.
18. See NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 17-20 (The Brookings Insti-
tution ed., 1992) (discussing the government's increased regulation & intervention in business
enterprises).
19. Under an import substitution model, a country pursues protectionist regulations and policies
to promote domestic industries in key sectors. The policy aims to substitute national products for
foreign manufactured imports. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 283-89 (8th ed. 1986).
20. JAMES CYPHER, STATE AND CAPITAL IN MEXICO: DEVELOPMENT POLICY SINCE 1940 555-
559 (discussing the Import Substitution program and its effects on Mexico's economy). (ed. 1990).
21. Id.




the developing world."2 3 But as one commentator has observed,
Mexicans had to pay a high price for this protectionist economic
structure:
Consumers had to pay a high price for the privilege of buying national.
Most Mexican-owned industries were unable to compete in foreign markets
without large subsidies .... [B]ecause subsidies are a charge on the national
budget, their use displaced other public expenditures."4
Consistent with Mexico's import substitution model, the govern-
ment adopted a legal framework expressly designed to stifle foreign
investment in protected industries and to direct such investment to
sectors where foreign entities posed little or no competitive threat. 5
The Mexican government legislated to exclude foreign participation
in key sectors of the economy, i.e., "strategic sectors" (petrochemi-
cals, mining, electricity) and additional non-strategic sectors such as
banking, insurance and other financial services .2  The government
also used regulatory vehicles to exclude foreign investment, includ-
ing discriminatory taxation, and selective use of permits and
licenses.27
During the early 1970's, President Luis Echeverria enacted three
major laws to ensure state control over the economy and to further
restrict foreign investment. These regulations, referred to as the
Echeverrian Wall, were: the Foreign Investment Law, 28 which lim-
ited foreign ownership in many sectors to 49 percent, or less, and
barred foreign investment outright in special "strategic" sectors; the
Transfer of Technology Law, 9 which restricted foreign control of
technology transferred to Mexican firms; and the Law of Industrial
Property,3 ° which, among other things, discouraged registration and
enforcement of foreign-source patents and trademarks.3
23. MIGUEL D. RAMIREZ, MEXICO'S ECONOMIC CRISIS: ITS ORIGIN AND CONSEQUENCES 41-43
(1984).
24. See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 559.
25. Id. at 562.
26. ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: U.S.- LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 20-21
(Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 1982).
27. Id.
28. Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexican y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera ("Law to Pro-
mote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment"), D. 0., Mar. 9, 1973.
29. Ley sobre el Control y Registro de la Transferencia de Tecnologia y el Uso Explotacion de
Patentes y Marcas, D. 0., June 11, 1982.
30. Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, D. 0., Feb. 10, 1976, at 7.
31. For a critique and analysis of Mexico's intellectual property and transfer of technology laws
during this period, see Ewell E. Murphy, The Echeverrian Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign
Investments and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 135, 142-44 (1982).
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Despite these and other restrictions, foreign investment continued
to flow into Mexico at a steady pace, particularly from the United
States.82 Indeed, Mexico enjoyed sustained economic growth which
continued to attract foreign investors until the late 1970's.33 Mean-
while, funded primarily with United States bank loans and stimu-
lated by Mexico's oil boom during the early 1980's, the Mexican
public sector expanded enormously. 4
B. Dismantling The Statist Economic Model
Notwithstanding Mexico's decades of relatively steady economic
growth, by 1982, oil prices fell and Mexico found itself unable to
service the massive foreign debt accumulated during the period of
largesse."8 When the bottom fell out of Mexico's economic model,
Mexicans entered into a nearly decade-long depression; including a
period of unmanageable foreign debt, rampant inflation and wide-
spread capital flight.8 6
Mexico's economic crisis, among other things, revealed the toll
taken on the Mexican economy by the decades of political centrali-
zation and economic protectionism." Under President Miguel de la
Madrid, who took office in 1982, Mexico dramatically changed its
economic policies, replacing the old nationalist policies with a free
market approach to development and economic growth.3 8 Crucially,
de la Madrid began to address the most significant structural prob-
lem of all - the heavy-handed role of the state in the economy.
Departing from the old import substitution model meant that the
state and its regulatory foundation had to be dismantled. Conse-
quently, between 1982 and 1990, nearly 900 government-owned en-
32. From 1955-1982, Mexico received $113.5 billion in net foreign investment, among the high-
est in the developing world. See WILSON PEREZ NU Ez, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND IN-
DUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 15 (Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ed., 1990).
33. LusTIG, supra note 18, at 14-17 (discussing Mexico's "Golden Years of 'Stabilizing
Development' ").
34. See id. at 20-21 (stating that the oil boom lead to a decrease in government actions in the
economic and political arenas, which in turn strengthened public sector growth).
35. See id. at 24-26 (stating that an "increased demand for imports in turn aggravated the
trade deficit," which Mexico found itself unable to repay because of higher interest rates, devalua-
tion of the peso and inflation).
36. Id. at 28-60 (discussing Mexico's attempt at recovery from the depression beginning in
1982 and continuing into the 1990's).
37. Id. (discussing the challenges encountered in Mexico's repeated attempts at recovery from
the depression).
38. Weintraub, supra note 22, at 559.
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terprises were divested.3 9 President de la Madrid also set in motion
a major liberalization of Mexico's trade regime. 4 0 Mexico's acces-
sion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
41
signaled a decisive break from the staunchly protectionist policies of
the past.
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, elected in 1988, sharply ac-
celerated the profound economic restructuring that his predecessor's
had begun. Salinas initiated a series of bold reforms because he be-
lieved that Mexico, in the 1990's, had to be "better positioned in the
competition for [foreign] capital. ' 2 Toward this end, Salinas set out
to create a more favorable climate for foreign direct investment as a
central focus of his National Development Plan (1989-1994). 41 He
restructured Mexico's massive foreign debt, continued Mexico's
broad privatization plan and decreased inflation through price and
wage controls."
The Salinas administration set out to reform, and in some cases
abrogate, many of the restrictive laws and regulations enacted dur-
ing the 1970's and beyond. In 1989, Mexico adopted new foreign
investment regulations authorizing 100 percent foreign ownership of
Mexican companies.45 Two years later, Mexico abrogated the for-
mer restrictive intellectual property regime by enacting a new and
39. In 1983, the Mexican state owned 1,155 enterprises. By March 1991, only 269 remained.
Id. at 564.
40. Id. at 559-60.
41. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT] reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments (4th Supp. 1969).
42. Jeff Silverstein, An Interview With Pres. Salinas, Bus. MEx., Aug. 1992, at 18.
43. Amendments to the Constitution in 1983 expanded the Executive Branch's broad powers to
direct economic development. Amendments to the Constitution, approved Feb. 2, 1983, reprinted
in Federal Official Gazette, Diario Oficial, Feb. 3, 1983 (amending arts. 16, 25, 27 (§§XIX, XX),
28, 73 (§§XXIX-A, XXIX-E, XXIX-F)). Pursuant to those powers, President Salinas directed a
national economic development plan that emphasized the role of private investment as the catalyst
for economic growth. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1989-1994, Diario Oficial, May 31, 1989.
Under Salinas, in 1987, the Mexican government also enacted the Economic Solidarity Pact, im-
posing wage and price freezes in order to lower inflation. Goldin, supra note 14, at 223.
44. LUSTIG. supra note 18, at 55-59.
45. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Ex-
tranjera [Foreign Investment Regulations], D. 0., May 16, 1989. In 1993, an entirely new foreign
investment law regime, Ley de Inversion Extranjera [Foreign Investment Law], D. 0., Dec. 27,
1993, was enacted, further liberalizing the rules for foreign investment in Mexico. The new For-
eign Investment Law authorizes virtually unlimited foreign investment in many sectors of the
economy, thereby codifying NAFTA's provisions regarding "national treatment" for NAFTA in-
vestors in the trade area.
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comprehensive Industrial Property Law,46 and an amended and up-
dated copyright law. 7
However, Salinas and his advisors recognized that domestic re-
form would not be sufficient to transform Mexico into a major
player in international markets. 8 Mexico needed closer economic
integration - via a free trade agreement - with the United States
to give Mexico a "clear opportunity for attracting additional foreign
capital."49
At first glance, it may appear incongruous that the Mexican gov-
ernment would so eagerly pursue a free trade accord with the
United States, a country from which Mexico historically has sought
to remain independent. Of course, as a matter of rudimentary eco-
nomic theory, domestic economic liberalization goes hand-in-hand
with lowering protectionist barriers. At the same time, however, the
deeply intertwined nature of political and economic power in Mex-
ico ensured that political realities also underlay the Salinas adminis-
tration's fervent advocacy of NAFTA. 50 The free trade agreement
was critical to the success of Salinas' grand economic reforms upon
which, in turn, Salinas and the PRI had effectively staked their po-
litical future.
The logic behind Salinas' push for NAFTA consisted of two ma-
jor elements. First, the economic crises of the early 1980s demanded
dramatic action from the central government.0 1 Failure to act deci-
sively would have inevitably threatened the PRI's previously unas-
sailable political base. As one commentator put it:
With a slimmer bureaucracy and fewer political spoils, the PRI realizes that
it can preserve a measure of its political monopoly only if the economy pros-
pers and only if jobs and salaries increase. In the judgment of President
Salinas and his advisers, this can only happen by increasing its trade and
investment with the United States, its major trading partner and source of
46. Ley de Fomento, y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial [Law to Foster and Protect Indus-
trial Property], D. 0., June 27, 1991.
47. Ley Federal de Derechos de Autor [Copyright Law], D. 0., July 17, 1991. NAFTA has its
own intellectual property provisions. However, NAFTA does not establish specific offenses and
enforcement procedures. Instead, NAFTA relies on each Party to establish and maintain legal
regimes to punish those that violate intellectual property laws. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 3
arts. 1707, 1717 (committing each Party to provide criminal procedures and penalties for trade-
mark counterfeiting and satellite decoding devices).
48. NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1707, 1717.
49. Id.
50. Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North





In other words, after massive privatization of state-owned enter-
prises, the PRI - in power for over 65 years - had no choice but
to seek a closer trade and investment relationship with the United
States to maintain political control. Second, approval of NAFTA
would help Salinas ensure the permanence of Mexico's domestic
shift to free market policies.58 A trade agreement with the United
States would reassure foreign investors who may not have had confi-
dence that Mexico's reforms would survive the Salinas administra-
tion. Investors had good reason to worry. The President of Mexico
enjoys enormous power to pursue and implement his own policies."
The same presidential powers that allowed Salinas to restructure
Mexico's economy likewise could enable Mexico's new president to
reverse the changes toward a free market economy. In this regard,
Salinas needed NAFTA to solidify Mexico's macroeconomic re-
forms and to ensure that Mexico did not return to the unstable eco-
nomic conditions that it had experienced in past decades. 55
C. Mexico's Decision To Enact A Comprehensive Competition
Law
Both the immediate and long-term viability of Mexico's shift to
market liberalization hinge on the government's capacity to prevent
- or at least to minimize - anticompetitive economic behavior en-
demic to the country's economy. Accordingly, competition policy as-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The President is the most active legislator in Mexico. Over 90% of the legislative bills
presented in Congress originate in the President's office. The President appoints members of the
judiciary, influences most of the seats in the Congress, and appoints political allies as well as state
governors and municipal presidents. PABLO G. CASANOVA, LA DEMOCRACIA EN Mtxico (1964).
As Octavio Paz pointedly observed twenty years ago: "The President is the man of the law: his
power is institutional. Mexican presidents are constitutional dictators .... They have the power
while they are presidents; and their power is almost absolute .... " Octavio Paz, Return to the
Labyrinth of Solitude, in THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE, 336-37 (Rachel Belash, trans., 1985).
55. While President Ernesto Zedillo has continued the free-market policies of his immediate
predecessor, he faces the most serious financial crisis since Mexico's 1982 economic crisis. The
peso has lost nearly 70% of its value, Mexico's foreign reserves are nearly depleted and many
foreign investors have abandoned Mexico's stock market. In a recent poll, a majority of Mexicans
blamed former President Salinas for the financial crisis. See Juanita Darling, Peso Fiasco Sullies
Salinas' Claim to Fame; Mexico: The Former President's Vaunted Economic Stabilization is in
Tatters. His Political Foes Even Call for Prosecution., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at A4. In an-
other recent poll nearly two-thirds of Mexico City residents expressed a lack of confidence in
Zedillo's ability to lead the country out of the present crisis. Paul B. Carroll & Dianne Solis,
Mexico's Zedillo Stumbles in His New Job, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A10.
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sumed a central place in the reformers' plans. Concern with compe-
tition issues and monopolies is not new in Mexico. Indeed, Mexico's
1857 Constitution prohibited monopolies, predating the Sherman
Act by almost forty years. 6 In 1934, Mexico enacted its first anti-
trust statute, called the 1934 Monopoly Law. 57 However, the an-
timonopoly provisions in the Constitution and federal legislation did
little to reduce anticompetitive behavior in the Mexican economy. In
the sixty years since the enactment of the 1934 Act, the federal
courts decided only eight precedent decisions." Mexico's experience
in this regard is no different from that of other Latin American
countries that have enacted antitrust legislation." In Mexico's case,
sparse antitrust enforcement was due to the absence of any adminis-
trative or judicial entity responsible for enforcing the law against
anticompetitive market conduct. 60
What is new in Mexico today is the existence of a comprehensive
competition policy that aims to eliminate anti-competitive market
practices through specific enforcement mechanisms. As mentioned,
Mexico only recently has emerged from several decades of state
control over the national economy. By the end of 1991, Mexico had
virtually completed profound restructuring of the economy, includ-
ing the massive sale of state-owned enterprises. The country was
moving at an accelerated pace toward open competition and interna-
tional trade. Mexico joined GATT and began negotiations with the
United States for a free trade accord.6
However, over several decades, state protectionist policies had in-
sulated Mexican businesses from the constant hum of market-driven
competition. Government support of national firms had created
oligopolistic, inefficient corporations in Mexico. 62 Further, the gov-
ernment's labyrinthine system of regulatory control had rewarded
those firms that had learned how to manipulate governmental com-
missions and bureaus rather than those that had responded effi-
56. COMISION FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, Annual Report, 1993-1994, at 1, 34 (hereinafter
"Annual Report").
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id.
59. Juliana L.B. Viegas & Robson G. Barreto, Brazil's Computer & Software Laws: A Much-
Needed Update and Summary, 24 INTERAM. L. REV. 37, 44 (1992) (discussing effects of recent
legal changes to the Brazilian computer sector).
60. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 1.
61. GATT supra note 3.
62. See Rudiger Dornbusch, The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries, 72 J.
ECON. PERSP. 69, 69 (1992).
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ciently to market-driven forces to cut costs, improve products and
provide better service for consumers. 3
Perhaps the best example of this was found in the banking sector.
Former President Salinas privatized Mexico's banks in 1992.84 All
national banks previously had been nationalized by Lopez Portillo
(1976-1982) shortly before the end of his presidential term.65 De-
spite Salinas' swift privatizations, Mexican banks continued to en-
gage in the anticompetitive practices "that have given them a repu-
tation locally as inefficient, and, often, corrupt."' 6 Regulatory
authorities have not devoted significant resources to investigate ille-
gal banking practices, due in part, to the government's quid pro quo
with the newly-privatized banks. Essentially, the government gar-
nered high sales prices from the investors who purchased the banks,
while promising the new bank owners mild enforcement of banking
regulations. 67 Lack of regulatory oversight has enabled the banks to
collude with other financial institutions, to create shell companies,
and otherwise to commit fraud against government regulatory
authorities.
Mexico's Attorney General's Office has a backlog of several hun-
dred cases involving bank fraud, embezzlement and other financial
crimes.6 8 Most recently, a Mexican financier with a controlling in-
terest in Banco Union, one of the largest banks in Mexico, was
charged with a number of fraudulent business practices, including
funneling between $200 million and $700 million to himself through
loans extended to shell companies. 9 In short, the banks, like many
63. See Javier Aguilar Alvarez de Alba, Caracteristicas Esenciales de la Ley Federal de Com-
petencia Ecomomica, ESTUDIOS EN TORNO A LA LEY FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONOMICA, at
13 (Universidad nacional Automoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas ed., 1994)
(herein after Estudios); Annual Report, supra note 56, at 2.
64. LUSTIG, supra note 18, at 56-57 (noting the government's formal announcement in 1990 to
privatize the banking system).
65. Id. at 25.
66. Tod Robberson, Mexico's Banking Afflicts Investors; Corruption Said to Be Compounding
Risk, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at A35. The anticompetitive practices of the largest banks
include the exchange of information regarding interest rates and credit card transaction fees, Id.
67. See Carlos M. Nalda, NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and the Mexican Banking System, 26
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 379, 408-12 (1992) (discussing the privatization of Mexican
banks by selling the state-owned banks for divestiture proceeds estimated at $10 billion).
68. See Robberson, supra note 66, at A35.
69. Craig Torres & Dianne Solis, Plucking Pieces of Del Monte, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at
Al. Mr. Carlos Cabal controls a banking and fresh-produce empire valued at $2 billion. Id. Mex-
ico's Finance Ministry issued arrests warrants against Cabal and several associates. Id. At least 10
people have been arrested, making the criminal investigation into Cabal' empire the largest action
against a bank in over two decades. Id.
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other large Mexican enterprises, are still able to exploit the cozy
private sector-government relationship that is a product of the many
decades of state protection of domestic enterprises.70
As such, Mexico of the 1990's has inherited a highly concentrated
industrial sector, and a financial sector that has grown accustomed
to a secure relationship with regulatory authorities. A single firm
controls over 60 % of the cement market; five firms share over 70 %
of the total sales in the construction industry; the former state tele-
communications monopoly, Telmex, still controls over 90 % of the
telephone services market. 71 As prevalent as the high level of con-
centration in the Mexican economy, so too is opportunistic behavior
on the part of private entities. Government policies allowed and
often encouraged producing sectors where monopolistic practices
were treated as the acceptable way of doing business. 2
President Salinas and his advisors concluded that Mexico needed
a new relationship between the private sector and the government.73
Mexico's restructured economy required new rules and standards
for free market participation. Effective competition in international
markets could flourish only if the market distortions of the previous
statist system were abolished. 74 Simply removing state enterprises
from the economy would not necessarily promote open competition
because private monopolies and oligopolies could opportunistically
replace the state in its control of the national economy.
70. As part of Mexico's effort to comply with NAFTA, new regulations for the operation of
foreign banks in Mexico have been enacted. These regulations dramatically increase opportunities
for foreign financial institutions. Mexico has amended its Credit Institutions Law and the Finan-
cial Groups Law to authorize foreign investment in banks, securities firms, insurance providers,
investment management companies, factoring companies, and foreign exchange firms. Consistent
with NAFTA's financial services provisions, these regulatory changes are designed to give special
preference to NAFTA-based financial institutions. See, e.g., Credit Institution Law, arts. 45-A-
45-N (stating that "treaty banks" may establish wholly-owned subsidiary financial institutions in
Mexico).
71. See Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico's New Economic Competition Law. Toward the Develop-
ment of a Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587, 603 (1994) (noting the
high level of industrial concentration in Mexico). Not surprisingly, the families that control these
firms happen to be the wealthiest families in Mexico. See Graham Button, et al., There's Lots of
Opportunity, FORBES, Jan. 30, 1995, at 46 (listing Mexican billionaires).
72. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The experience in other parts of the world bears this out. Even after a shift from non-
market economies, many developing and former Communist nations continued to experience an-
ticompetitive market conduct. Consequently, the countries of Eastern Europe, a number of former
Soviet republics and several nations in Latin America and Africa recently have adopted antitrust/
competition law regimes. See Jonathan D. Glater, Busting Trusts, South of the Border. Latin
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President Salinas submitted a draft of the LFCE to Congress in
the last quarter of 1992 designed to implement an ambitious new
regime vital to the development of an efficient and competitive mar-
ket economy.70 The draft law aimed to eliminate cartel practices
such as price-fixing and market-sharing arrangements by subjecting
these, and other, "monopolistic practices" to legal scrutiny and ad-
ministrative enforcement for the first time.7 Competition law advo-
cates in Mexico believed that everyone would benefit from an effec-
tive competition law regime.78 Consumers would benefit by gaining
access to quality goods and services at the lowest prices, and suppli-
ers of goods and services would benefit from the new emphasis on
efficiency and participation in a more competitive market environ-
ment.79 Congress passed the Federal Law of Economic Competition
("LFCE," for the Spanish acronym), Ley Federal de Competencia
Economica) on December 22, 1992.80 The law became effective on
June 22, 1993.81
II. THE COMPETITION LAW AND THE FEDERAL COMPETITION
COMMISSION
A. Purpose And Scope of LFCE
The sole purpose of the LFCE is "to protect the process of com-
petition and free market access through the prevention and elimina-
tion of monopolies, monopolistic practices and other restrictions that
deter the operation of the market for goods and services." '82 The
scope of the law is broad by any measure, sweeping by Mexican
standards. The LFCE applies to "all economic agents." 83  It ex-
Countries Take Antitrust Lessons from U.S. to Open Markets, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1993, at
BI.
76. Alvarez de Alba, supra note 63, at 11-13.
77. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. LFCE, supra note 1.
81. Under President Zedillo, Mexico has continued the process of deregulation and privatiza-
tion. Also, Mexico's implementation of NAFTA has accelerated the pace of economic reforms. As
important, the financial crisis in early 1995 will result in substantial new privatizations of state-
owned enterprises and further market-freeing reforms. The international emergency aid package
to Mexico early this year was conditioned on Mexico's commitment to make further fiscal and
monetary reforms, and to privatize remaining state-owned entities. See David E. Sanger, Peso
Rescue Sets New Limits on Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al.
82. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 2.
83. Id. art. 3.
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pressly applies not only to private entities, but also to federal, state
and municipal governments, divisions, agencies and entities., 4 The
application of Mexico's antitrust enforcement scheme to all govern-
mental entities is a major policy component of the law. The LFCE's
proponents recognized that the state had been largely responsible
for the proliferation of many anticompetitive practices in Mexico:
The competitive environment is greatly influenced by the direct participation
of the State, as a producer and as a consumer, as well as by the regulations,
that directly or indirectly affect economic activity. Even though the objec-
tive of the latter is to increase efficiency, insofar as the [their] spirit is al-
ways procompetitive, occasionally they have unexpected effects, or improper
enforcement results in monopoly power. Since the new legislation proposes
the adoption of an integral competition policy rather than an anti-trust pol-
icy to be applied only to prevent unregulated agents, State activities fall
within the jurisdiction of the law." The new law therefore is intended to
serve as the basis for a comprehensive, and rigorously enforced, competition
policy, not simply a narrowly-focused antitrust law regime.86
The LFCE expressly repealed several laws and regulations that ena-
bled the federal government to control specific areas of the econ-
omy.87 Thus, for the first time, Mexico's state enterprises - and the
government itself - became subject to the forces of competition.
The drafters of the LFCE carved out narrow exemptions from the
law's mandates. As required by the Constitution, the law exempts
those governmental activities exercised exclusively in "the strategic
sectors."88 Under Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution, these ac-
84. Id. This provision incorporates - and augments - the Mexican Constitution's prohibition
against the individual states' interference with the transport of foreign or domestic goods through
state lines. See MEX. CONST. art. 117 (prohibiting individual states from interfering with the pas-
sage of domestic goods through their territories).
85. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter "OECD"),
Economic and Legal Background for Mexico's New Competition Law (Note by the Secretariat),
Apr. 30, 1993, at 6. Under United States law, no express limitation on governmental power to
restrain trade exists. Indeed, the Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary power to restrain trade
as part of its authority to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
Additionally, state-imposed restraints of trade are immunized from antitrust challenge under the
state action doctrine. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (holding that a valid exercise of
a state's legislative authority does not violate the Sherman Act). A state may engage in anticom-
petitive conduct so long as it has a "clearly articulated" regulatory scheme, and it has exercised
-active supervision" and control over the regulatory scheme. See Hoover v. Ronwin (1980), 466
U.S. 558, 569 (1984) (discussing the degree of control necessary for the state action doctrine to
apply); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (invalidating California's resale price maintenance scheme for wine because of insufficient
supervision by the state).
86. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 5-6.
87. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 3.
88. Id. art. 4; MEX. CONST. art. 28.
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tivities include oil, basic petrochemicals, radiotelegraphy, satellite
communications, hydrocarbons, public electricity service, railroads,
postal service, nuclear energy, and currency issuance.89 In addition,
the LFCE exempts worker associations or unions "formed in accor-
dance with relevant legislation." 90 Export associations or cartels are
also exempt as long as they do not offer their products for sale or
distribution in Mexico and the products are "the principal source of
wealth produced in the region . . . ."" This language mirrors the
export cartel exemption contained in the Mexican Constitution.92
B. Role of the Federal Competition Commission
The LFCE creates an autonomous administrative body, the Fed-
eral Competition Commission, to investigate and prosecute anticom-
petitive practices in Mexico.9 The Commission consists of five
Commissioners and a Commission President.9 4 The President of
Mexico appoints members of the Commission to serve ten-year re-
newable terms.9 Members may be removed from office only for "se-
rious reasons duly justified." 9 The Commission's mandate is very
broad. Moreover, the Commission's short history to date suggests
that it intends to exercise considerable authority in implementing
the law, rather than to function as a mere formalistic instrument for
effectuating the competition law. 97 In its inaugural Annual Report,
published in 1994, the Commission defined its mission in ample
terms: "to foster economic efficiency and increase social welfare."98
As interpreted by the Commission, this charge does not translate
into automatic advocacy of unbridled, free market economics;
rather, the Commission maintains that "competition is not an end in
itself, but a tool to increase social welfare . . . ." These statements,
especially when combined with some of the Commission's concrete
89. MEX. CONST., art. 28.
90. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 5.
91. Id. art. 6.
92. MEX. CONST., art. 28.
93. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 23.
94. Id. art. 25.
95. Id. art. 26.
96. Id. art. 27.
97. See generally Annual Report, supra note 56 (reviewing the Commission's first-year
activities).




actions,1"' suggest that the Commission will play a vigorous role in
forging Mexico's new economic reality.
The Competition Law itself endows the Commission with a formi-
dable array of powers. Specifically, the LFCE empowers the Com-
mission: 1) to investigate competition law offenses, at the request of
a private party or on its own initiative; 2) to resolve administrative
cases in the area of competition law, impose administrative penalties
and refer criminal business practices to the Attorney General; 3) to
issue advisory opinions upon request by the Executive Branch re-
garding the Competition Law implications of draft laws and regula-
tions; 4) to issue legal opinions, on its own initiative, regarding com-
petition and free market access issues; 5) and to participate in the
negotiation and execution of international competition policy, trea-
ties and agreements. 01
The LFCE also grants the Commission unprecedented enforce-
ment tools. The Commission has the authority to enjoin any busi-
ness practice in violation of the provisions of the LFCE.'02 The
Commission may also order the partial or total divestiture of a
merger or acquisition in noncompliance.' 0 3 No other administrative
entity in Mexico enjoys such broad enforcement powers.
The Commission is also authorized to impose substantial fines for
antitrust offenses.' 04 Fines are indexed to the minimum wage in the
Federal District, and vary with the specific type of antitrust viola-
tion.' 0 5 Potential fines under the LFCE are the largest penalties that
may be levied under Mexican law.' 06
Given that the LFCE grants the Commission authority over state-
run enterprises, the Commission's effectiveness depends to a large
100. See infra notes 207-57 and accompanying text (discussing some of the commission's
actions).
101. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 24.
102. Id. art. 35. Injunctive, or other equitable, relief generally is not available in Mexico. JAMES
E. HERGET & JORGE CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 40 (1978).
103. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 35.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In the case of an "absolute monopolistic practice," the Commission may impose a fine in
the amount of 375,000 times the minimum wage (approximately U.S. $1.7 million at the rate of
exchange in 1993). See id. As a result of the Mexican peso's dramatic plunge early this year, the
index for antitrust penalties will undergo adjustment. Although significant by Mexican standards,
the fines possibly are less important as an enforcement tool than the injunctive powers available to
the Commission. In its first year of operation, for example, the Commission levied less than U.S.
$800,000 in fines for all antitrust enforcement actions. See Annual Report, supra note 56, at 19.
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extent on its autonomy from control by the central government. 10 7
The Commissioners' ten-year terms should give them a certain level
of autonomy since Mexico's presidential term is six years."0 ' Also,
the Commission's Internal Regulations establish the Commission as
a self-governing agency of the Ministry of Finance and Trade Pro-
motion (SECOFI), with a budget and staff independent of that
Ministry. 0 9 These provisions are intended to guarantee the Com-
mission's financial independence.' 10
C. Regulation Of Anticompetitive Activities
The LFCE's substantive provisions begin with a general prohibi-
tion of "monopolies" and other practices that "diminish, impair or
prevent competition and free access in the production, processing,
distribution and marketing of goods or services." ' The LFCE,
however, does not contain an explicit monopolization prohibition
similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the United
States.1 1 2 The law seeks to avoid evaluating firms solely by their size
or their dominant position in the market. Rather, the Commission
has emphasized that "the new legislation rejects the idea that big
firms are by themselves monopolies." '"3
The LFCE focuses on specific categories of market conduct, and
classifies numerous market activities as either "absolute" or "rela-
tive" monopolistic practices." 4 The Competition Law treats "abso-
lute monopolistic practices" as per se illegal, permitting no assess-
ment of either the purpose or effect of the anticompetitive
conduct." 5 In contrast, "relative monopolistic practices" are judged
by reference to specific economic criteria set forth in the law." 6 The
Commission's analysis in deciding both "absolute" and "relative"





111. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 8.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
113. OECD, supra note 85, at 5 (noting the LFCE's rejection of rigid rules utilized in the past
to prohibit monopolistic behavior).
114. Id. at 3.
115. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 9; GABRIEL CASTANEDA, ET AL, ANTECEDENTES ECONOMICOS
PARA UNA LEY FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONOMICA, 3-4 (1992); see also OECD, supra note
85, at 3 (explaining the treatment of absolute monopolistic practices in Mexico).
116. OECD, supra note 85, at 4.
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cases parallels aspects of United States antitrust law which are
highlighted in the discussion below.
1. Absolute Monopolistic Practices
The Competition Law declares "absolute monopolistic practices"
void without inquiry and subjects firms engaged in such practices to
administrative penalties and injunctions."'. The Competition Law
defines these practices as contracts, agreements, arrangements or
combinations among competitors whose purpose or effect is: (1) to
fix prices or exchange information with the same purpose or effect;
(2) to restrict or limit the supply of goods or services; (3) to divide
markets, or allocate customers or suppliers among competitors; or
(4) to rig bids on contracts. 1 8 These market practices are punished
the most severely: approximately $1.7 million per offense, or for par-
ticularly serious violations, up to 10% of the firm's annual sales."19
The LFCE's treatment of absolute monopolistic practices effec-
tively mirrors the per se rule in United States' antitrust jurispru-
dence. In essence, the American per se rule flatly bars horizontal
trade restraints, i.e., arrangements between ostensibly competing
firms to manipulate price, supply, or any other aspect of market ac-
tivity.120 Thus, as a procedural matter, the respective per se rule in
Mexico and the United States is identical: when the adjudicatory
117. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 9.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 37.
120. The per se doctrine in United States antitrust law holds that certain market arrangements
are "so plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality .... " National Soc'y of Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978) (dis-
cussing the two categories of antitrust analysis; per se illegal actions and the rule of reason analy-
sis). The per se rule has been applied by the United States Supreme Court in a long line of
antitrust cases involving horizontal restraints on trade. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) (noting "we have not wavered in our enforcement of the
per se rule against price fixing"); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (following the
"long accepted rule in § 1 cases that resale price fixing is a per se violation of law"); United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (stating that the court has consist-
ently adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are illegal per se); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (establishing that price fixing is per se ille-
gal). The United States courts have also applied the per se rule to vertical restraints such as
"tying" arrangements, and resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (noting the vitality of the per se rule, but finding no basis for its
application to the tying arrangement in question); Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F. 2d 138, 142-
43 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that an alleged tying arrangement between the hospital and radiologist
did not violate the Sherman Act under either the per se rule or the rule of reason analysis).
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body finds the existence of a per se violation (United States)12 or
an absolute monopolistic practice (Mexico), 22 the monopolist has
no grounds to defend his or her actions. Those actions are, by law,
automatically illegal.'2 3 However, Mexico's ban on "absolute" mo-
nopolistic practices is somewhat substantively narrower than that of
the United States. In particular, the LFCE does not include tying
arrangements and resale price maintenance as subject to the per se
rule.12  Generally, a tying arrangement is an agreement in which
one party sells a product to another party on condition that the
buyer also purchase additional products from the seller or a third
party.' 25 Retail price maintenance occurs when the producer and
the retailer agree on a fixed price range for goods or services.' 26
Both practices are subject to the per se rule in the United States. 27
2. Relative Monopolistic Practices
The LFCE defines "relative monopolistic practices" as "those
acts, contracts, agreements, cartels or combinations, which purpose
or effect is to improperly displace other agents from the market,
substantially impede their access thereto, or to establish exclusive
advantages in favor of one or several entities or individuals ... .
under specific circumstances. 28 The law delineates seven market
practices that invite scrutiny from the Commission: (1) territorial
distribution restrictions; (2) resale price maintenance or other resale
conditions; (3) tying or reciprocity sale arrangements; (4) refusals to
deal; (5) exclusive dealing; (6) group boycotts; or (7) any act that
"unduly impairs or impedes the process of competition and free
market production, processing, distribution and marketing of goods
121. See Socony, 310 U.S. at 218 (prohibiting explanation or justification as a defense to price
fixing agreements under a per se illegality analysis).
122. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text (describing absolute monopolistic prac-
tices as per se illegal).
123. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 9.
124. Id.
125. See e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
126. See e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 US 373, 399-400
(1911).
127. United States courts apply a "quasi" per se analysis to tying arrangements and distribu-
tion contracts that contain resale price maintenance clauses. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (stating that the per se rule did not apply to the tying arrangement at
issue); Beard, 912 F. 2d 138 (holding that the tying arrangement between the hospital and radiol-
ogist did not violate the per se rule as applied).
128. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 10.
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or services. ' 119
The LFCE's "relative" monopolistic practices include market be-
havior that, in United States' antitrust law, fall under the general
rubric of "vertical restraints." Indeed, the Commission has openly
acknowledged that its analysis is similar to the "rule of reason"
framework long employed in United States antitrust jurispru-
dence."' Under this analysis, the court "weighs all of the circum-
stances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."'' 
Echoing this approach, the LFCE requires the Commission to weigh
the "purpose" and "effect" of every challenged relative monopolistic
practice in reaching its decision." 2
In Mexico, a firm engaged in a relative monopolistic practice runs
afoul of the LFCE when two conditions are met: (1) the firm pos-
sesses "substantial power in the relevant market"; and (2) the firm
exercises such market power over other economic agents.' 33 The
Competition Law sets forth specific criteria for defining the "rele-
vant market" and for measuring a firm's market power in that mar-
ket. Determining the "relevant market" consists of analysis of the
following criteria:
(1) the availability of substitute goods;
(2) transportation, distribution and input costs;
(3) the firm's market share and that of its competitors;
(4) the cost and probability of consumers seeking other markets;
(5) tariffs and other restrictions limiting consumer access to alter-
native sources of supply.
3 4
When measuring a firm's market power in the relevant market,
the Commission evaluates these criteria:
(1) the firm's share of the relevant market, and whether it can
unilaterally fix prices or restrict supply in the relevant market with-
out the competing entities being able to offset, at present or poten-
tially, the firm's leverage in the market;
129. Id.
130. OECD, supra note 85, at 3.
131. Business Electronics v. Sharp Elect., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (quoting Continental TN.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). The "rule of reason" analysis was first articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 60 (1911).
132. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 10.
133. Id. art. 11.
134. Id. art. 12.
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(2) the existence of entry barriers;
(3) the existence and market power of competitors;
(4) the access of the firm, and its competitors, to sources of
supply;
(5) the firm's recent conduct;
(6) any other criteria established by regulation.13 5
As with the absolute monopolistic practices discussed above, the
Mexican analysis of "relative" monopolistic practices bears striking
similarities to the United States' vertical restraint analysis.136
D. Commission Regulation of Merger And Acquisition Activities
The Competition Law is not only concerned with existing monop-
olies and monopolistic practices, but also seeks to limit monopolies
at their inception. The Law's approach toward mergers and acquisi-
tions is preventive - only mergers and acquisitions that fit within
specified size thresholds will be subject to the law.13 7 It thus pur-
ports to regulate only those mergers that pose a serious threat to
competition.
The LFCE establishes two mechanisms for the Commission to
monitor and regulate merger activity. First, similar to the antitrust
laws in Canada 3 ' and the United States,"3 9 the Competition Law
requires that parties notify the Commission in advance of entering
into mergers or acquisitions which fit within the following notifica-
tion thresholds: 1) acquisitions valued at United States $55 million
135. Id. art. 13.
136. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (citing vertical restraint decisions by United
States courts which have applied the "rule of reason" analysis).
137. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (indicating the statutory thresholds for notifica-
tion to the Commission of anticipated mergers and acquisitions).
138. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-34, S. 92, as amended (1986). In Canada, mergers
are a reviewable practice subject to an inquiry of "substantial prevention or lessening of Competi-
tion." Id. The Act sets forth an exhaustive list of criteria, including the extent of foreign competi-
tion, whether the merger involves a failing business, the availability of substitutes, entry barriers,
the level of foreign competition remaining after the merger, the removal of an effective competitor
from the market and the nature of change and innovation in the market. Id. § 93. The transac-
tional thresholds are as follows: the parties to the transaction must have combined assets in Ca-
nada or annual gross revenues from sales in 1) from or into Canada over C $400 million; 2) in the
case of an acquisition of assets or shares, the value of the Canadian assets controlled through the
entity(ies) to which the shares pertain, or the annual gross revenues in or from Canada generated
by those assets, must exceed C $35 million. Id. §§ 120-22.
139. In the United States, this requirement is found in the Hart-Scott-Rodino notification pro-
visions. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-(h) (attorneys), 18(a)-(h) (parties) (1989). Section 18(a)
states that "no person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of any
other person, unless both persons . . . file notification .... " Id. § 18(a).
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or more; 2) transactions resulting in the accumulation of 35 percent
or more of the assets or sales of an entity with assets or sales in
excess of United States $55 million; and 3) transactions involving
merger partners with joint assets or annual sales over United States
$220 million and involving the additional accumulation of assets or
capital stock of United States $22 million or more.1 0
Second, the Commission may, on its own initiative, review any
merger or acquisition which may "diminish, impair or impede com-
petition and free market access."'" The Commission considers the
following factors while investigating possible unlawful combinations,
and regards them as evidence in support of the charge if the merger
or acquisition:
1. Bestows or may bestow on the merging party, the acquirer, or the eco-
nomic agent resulting from the concentration, the power to fix prices unilat-
erally or to substantially restrict the stock or supply [of products] in the
relevant market, without the competing economic agents being able, pres-
ently or potentially, to offset such power;
2. Intends or may intend to improperly displace other economic agents or
to prevent their access to the relevant market; and
3. Intends or has the effect of substantially permitting the participants in
said act or attempt to engage in monopolistic practices as referred to in
Chapter Two hereof. 1' 2
In determining whether a concentration is unlawful, the Commis-
sion applies the same criteria as used to evaluate "relative monopo-
listic practices."' 4 That is, the Commission must consider the "rele-
vant market" and the market power of the entities supplying the
relevant market.14 4 The Commission also must evaluate the degree
of concentration in the relevant market, and any "other criteria or
analytical instruments" the Commission may establish by
regulation.14
5
A party's merger notification must include the entities' most re-
cent financial statements, data regarding the firms' market share,
140. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 20; OCED, supra note 85, at 5 (noting that under the LFCE,
mergers and acquisitions are evaluated not only by their size, but also by the relationship between
the operation and the international market). All monetary figures are approximate. Under the
LFCE, threshold amounts are indexed to the minimum wage in the Federal District, and the
exchange rate, as of January, 1993. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 20, §§ 1, 2.
141. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 16.
142. Id. art. 17.
143. See Id. art. 10 (stating the general definition and categories of "relative monopolistic
practices").
144. Id. art. 18.
145. Id. art. 18, § 3.
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and other data relevant to evaluation of the proposed transaction. "6
The Commission may request additional information or documents
from the parties within 20 days of receipt of the initial notifica-
tion.14 The parties must respond within 15 days of the Commis-
sion's request for additional information. " 8 The Commission has 45
days from receipt of the additional information to issue a deci-
sion149 If the Commission fails to issue a decision within the statu-
tory period, "it shall be understood that the Commission has no ob-
jections whatsoever" to the proposed transaction.1 80
Transactions that have received a favorable Commission ruling
may no longer be challenged, except in cases where the Commission
rendered the ruling based on false information.1 5 ' Also, transactions
that do not require prior notification may not be challenged after
one year following their consummation.1 52 During its first year, the
Commission received fifty-two notifications for merger review.1 53
III. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Mexico's Competition Law establishes the framework for an
economy driven far more by market forces than it was previously.
The LFCE, however, remains quite new. Notwithstanding the far-
reaching reforms during the de la Madrid and Salinas administra-
tions,1 4 Mexico's economy still features both an active state role
and a high level of economic concentration. Therefore, the ease and
completeness of the transformation into Mexican economic reality
of the liberalizing, pro-competitive vision of the LFCE's drafters
will depend upon how effective the Commission is in pursuing the
law's mandates.
A. The Commission's Exclusive Jurisdiction
In monitoring and regulating Mexico's new pro-competition re-
gime, the role and authority of the Federal Competition Commis-
146. Id. art. 21, § I.
147. Id. art. 21, § II.
148. Id.
149. Id. art. 21, § III.
150. Id.
151. Id. art. 22, § I.
152. Id. art. 22, § II.
153. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 7.




sion is clearly paramount. Most importantly, the LFCE gives the
Commission exclusive antitrust jurisdiction. 15 5 The LFCE provides
that "[e]xcept as specified herein, no judicial or administrative ac-
tion may be based on this Act."1 56 Accordingly, no other federal
judicial or administrative entity may issue rulings or otherwise en-
force the LFCE. Likewise, the individual states cannot participate
in enforcement of the new law.' 57
This centralization of enforcement authority stands as a distinc-
tive feature of the new competition regime. While other aspects of
the law are modeled largely after United States antitrust law, 58
Mexico's centralized enforcement departs from the United States
model. In the United States, two federal agencies - the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") - have dual enforcement jurisdiction over antitrust mat-
ters.65 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC have over-
lapping jurisdiction over antitrust violations. The Antitrust Division
may enforce any of the federal antitrust laws and may bring crimi-
nal prosecutions under them. 60 The FTC may only enforce the
Clayton Act and may not bring criminal prosecutions, but it has the
authority to enjoin practices that may not be violations of the anti-
trust laws but are nevertheless violations in spirit.' 6' The two agen-
cies regularly consult with one another on the initiations of investi-
gations and lawsuits. 62 They typically divide responsiblities based
on their relative expertise in given areas and the availability of
their staff.' 63 Moreover, many states have active antitrust agencies
to enforce both federal and state antitrust statutes. Because of the
155. See Annual Report, supra note 56, at 5 (discussing the Commission's structure and deci-
sion-making authority).
156. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 38.
157. Under the Mexican Constitution, the regulation of monopolies and, more generally, com-
petition, is exclusively a federal matter. See MEX. CONST. art. 28. Consequently, the individual
states have never enacted laws regulating competition.
158. See supra notes 117-26 (discussing the absolute monomopolistic practices), 128-36 (dis-
cussing relative monopolistic practices).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1995) (authorizing United States Attorneys to bring civil suits in
federal courts to prevent and restrain antitrust violations); id. § 45 (authorizing the Federal Trade
Commission to bring proceedings to enforce antitrust laws, subject to judicial review by the
United States Courts of Appeal).







nature of American federalism, in which the states play important
roles in law enforcement, state antitrust enforcement has proved to
be complementary to federal enforcement in at least two ways.
First, state antitrust laws may be broader than federal laws, thus
allowing for more aggressive prosecutions. Second, since states may
enforce federal antitrust laws, there is a greater volume of antitrust
enforcement of federal law. These state enforcement agencies often
choose not to defer to the DOJ and the FTC for enforcement ac-
tions."" Mexico instead decided to centralize all antitrust enforce-
ment in a single agency.
B. Initiation of Investigatory And Enforcement Activities
Investigations of potentially illegal monopolistic activities and en-
forcement actions commence in one of two ways. The Commission
can initiate its own actions, or, alternatively, some actions may be
commenced by the filing of individual complaints with the
Commission.'65
1. The Commission's "Ex Officio" Investigations Of Monopolistic
Practices
The Commission has broad authority to initiate administrative
proceedings on its own - "ex officio" investigations - to examine
anticompetitive market practices in virtually any economic sector.'66
As described below, during the 1993-1994 period, the Commission
initiated sixteen investigations in important sectors of the Mexican
economy. 6
7
164. In the United States, each individual state government has the authority to enforce its own
antitrust laws. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-03 (1989) (holding that
the rule limiting federal antitrust recoveries to direct purchasers does not prevent the states, as
indirect purchasers, from recovering damages flowing from their own antitrust law violations).
State antitrust legislation generally is not preempted by the Sherman Act. Id. at 101. State attor-
neys general also have the authority to bring enforcement actions under the federal antitrust laws
as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens or consumers in their states. See H-S-R, Title III, Pub.
L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c (a)-(d) (1988)
(prescribing the manner in which State attorneys general may bring civil actions for damages to
enforce federal antitrust laws).
165. LFCE, supra note 1, arts. 30, 32.
166. Id. art. 15.
167. See infra notes 201-57 and accompanying text (summarizing a number of Commission
investigations of certain markets in the Mexican economy).
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2. Private Party Litigation
The LFCE also establishes a limited private cause of action for
challenging alleged anticompetitive business practices.168 In the case
of absolute monopolistic practices, "any person" may file a written
complaint against the alleged responsible party.169 If the challenged
activity is a relative monopolistic practice, the complainant must
show that he has sustained, or may sustain, "substantial damage or
loss. '"170 All competition law complaints must be filed with the Com-
mission.1 71 Private enforcement actions may turn out to be consider-
ably less important than the Commission's own authority to initiate
enforcement proceedings. As described below, during 1993-1994,
the Commission received a total of only twenty-two private party
complaints alleging unlawful monopolistic practices. 
7 2
The narrow role for private plaintiffs under the LFCE presents
interesting - and instructive - contrasts with the approach devel-
oped in United States antitrust law. As discussed, private parties in
Mexico may only bring claims before the Commission. 7 Thus, no
claims may be brought in the federal courts.
In contrast, the United States grants broad rights for private
party actions under the antitrust statutes. 7 United States law, in
fact, provides significant incentives to antitrust plaintiffs. For exam-
ple, treble damages are available,77 and, under the Clayton Act,
private litigants may bring class actions.'7 6 Not surprisingly, private
party enforcement actions have played a significant role in the de-
velopment of antitrust law in the United States. Liberal private en-
forcement mechanisms have at least two substantial advantages.
First, private enforcement allows a much greater volume of antitrust
enforcement actions to proceed. Since the government does not have
168. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 32.
169. Id.
170. Id. The law neither specifies how "substantial" the alleged loss must be, nor how the
Commission is to measure alleged losses in private party actions.
171. Id. art. 38 (stating that "[no] judicial or administrative action based on this Law will
proceed unless it has been established herein").
172. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 3.
173. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting that the LFCE grants the Federal
Competition Commission exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust actions).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1980) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . .").
175. Id. § 15 (stating that an individual who prevails in an antitrust action "shall recover three-




nearly enough resources to pursue every antitrust violation, private
enforcement allows it to concentrate its resources on the most im-
portant, ground-breaking cases. Because of the treble damages and
class action provisions, private parties have adequate incentive to
bring such suits. Second, government agencies are often captured by
the corporations that they are charged with regulating. Allowance
of private antitrust actions ensures that even if the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies are captured, suits may still proceed uninhibited.
3. Role of the Judiciary and Judicial Review
The LFCE envisions only a modest role for the Mexican courts in
enforcing the competition law. It may be best that the Mexican ju-
diciary have a limited role in the enforcement of the new law. The
Mexican judiciary has historically been viewed as lacking indepen-
dence and as prone to corruption.1 77 Although it would be unfair to
make such accusations in a blanket manner, there is certainly some
truth to it. Once a private party plaintiff has prevailed in a proceed-
ing before the Commission, he may file an action in the federal
court but only to recover damages. 178 The LFCE provides an "ap-
peal" procedure for review of the Commission's determinations. 17 9
However, this procedure acts as a request for reconsideration since
only the CFC itself may review the prior administrative determina-
tion. i80 In reconsidering a prior ruling, the CFC may revoke, modify
or affirm "the determination from which relief is sought.''
While the LFCE does not contain any statutory mechanism for
direct judicial review of Commission rulings, an aggrieved party
may file a constitutional challenge in the federal courts under a pro-
cedure known in Mexico as a juicio de amparo or writ of protec-
177. See, e.g., Juanita Darling, Mexican Judge Overturns Ex-Union Boss's Conviction, L.A.
TIMES, June 3, 1995; Tod Robberson, Mexican Drug Dealers Cut Pervasive Path: Nation is Top
Narcotics Supplier to U.S., WASH. POST, May 31 1993; Jim Schacter, Widespread Camera Case
Bribery Alleged, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1987.
178. Under the LFCE, an aggrieved party that has demonstrated an antitrust violation, and
competitive injury, may be entitled to damages. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 38. The CFC has the
authority to assess damages in private party actions. However, the CFC cannot enforce the dam-
ages order. Private litigants must file an action in the courts to enforce the CFC's assessment of
damages. Id.
179. Id. art. 39.
180. Id.
181. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 35. If the Commission rejects an "appeal" involving the imposi-
tion of a fine, the appealing party may file an administrative adversary proceeding before the
Federal Tax Court. Annual Report supra note 56, at 5.
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tion. 82 As Mexican constitutional law experts have commented, the
amparo is available to protect individual guarantees provided to all
Mexicans under the Constitution. 8 However, amparo relief is
available only for acts or laws by government authorities and not for
the acts of private parties." This is essentially a "state action" re-
quirement. Further, only individuals who can establish concrete, in-
dividualized harm can petition for amparo.86 Finally, a statute or
administrative act successfully challenged in an amparo action be-
comes invalid only as to the parties to the proceeding. 86
Due to the substantial procedural limitations in amparo actions,
the judiciary is not likely to review many decisions of the Commis-
sion. Additionally, most judges and lawyers are not yet familiar
with the provisions of the LFCE, and its application to specific mar-
ket practices in Mexico. 87 Although the availability of an amparo
action may result in a few judicial rulings in the area of antitrust,
these court rulings are not likely to play a major role in this new
area of the law.' 88 During the first year since enactment of the law,
no court decision interpreting the LFCE was published. Instead, the
CFC has had, and likely will continue to have, exclusive jurisdiction
over interpretation and enforcement of the new antitrust law.
C. The Importance of Exclusive Jurisdiction and Centralized
Enforcement in the Mexican Context
The LFCE's centralized antitrust enforcement regime and its lim-
ited review mechanisms are consistent with the civil law tradition in
Mexico and Latin America. 8 " Several other civil law jurisdictions
182. For discussion of the role of the Writ of Amparo in Mexico's judicial system, see RICHARD
D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXiCO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 111-63 (1971); Hector
Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 306
(1979); HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 102, at 27-29.
183. Zamudio, supra note 182, at 607.
184. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 102, at 28 (stating "state action" requirement for amparo
relief under Art. 107 of the Mexico Constitution).
185. Id. (stating that Art. 107 authorizes amparo relief only to concrete cases by petition of an
individual).
186. See HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 102, at 28 (stating that amparo applies only to chal-
lenges to government action).
187. See Annual Report, supra note 56, at 2 (citing examples where the Commission has
sought to apply and enforce the LFCE in specific markets).
188. But see Newberg, supra note 71, at 607 ("[A]mparo suits could substantially involve the
courts both in the interpretation of the [LFCE] and in passing judgment on the actions and deter-
minations of the Federal Competition Commission.").
189. For an overview of civil law systems, see JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADI-
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in Latin America have created exclusive administrative entities to
enforce their respective antitrust laws.' 90 Civil law systems such as
Mexico's rely largely on administrative procedures for the enforce-
ment of statutory rights in numerous areas. 9' Consequently, admin-
istrative agencies, as appendages of the Executive Branch, often
have greater power and authority than the judiciary to enforce the
law. 9
2
The broad powers and centralized authority of the CFC also re-
flect the relatively limited authority and role of the Mexican judicial
system. The judicial system is perceived by many as plagued with
considerable delays, institutional corruption and a lack of indepen-
dence.' 93 Given the lack of confidence in the judiciary, empowering
the Commission to handle all antitrust cases is therefore possibly the
best way to develop a new area of specialized law in Mexico. With
exclusive authority to interpret the LFCE, 94 the Commission enjoys
maximum control over the quality, timing and overall integrity of
the decision-making process.
In addition, litigation in the Mexican courts is not a common
method for resolving commercial disputes. The judicial process is
lengthy, unpredictable and presents the danger of destroying long-
term business relationships. 195 In a society where relationships are
all-important, and where many enterprises - even very large ones
- remain family-owned, Mexicans avoid litigation at all costs.' 96 In
contrast, administrative enforcement of the law may be more condu-
cive to compromise. This was evident during the Commission's first
year of enforcement of the LFCE. In the two most significant ad-
TION (2d ed. 1985). In civil law nations, it is common for numerous judicial and/or administrative
court systems to operate simultaneously, each having exclusive jurisdiction over a single entity. Id.
at 85.
190. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela also require that all enforcement cases be filed with the
antitrust authority. Argentine Law 22,262 see Inter Am LR n60.
191. See, Zamora, supra note 50, at 423 (discussing Mexico's greater reliance on administra-
tive law as opposed to litigation through the judiciary).
192. See MERRYMAN, supra note 189, at 85-87 (discussing generally the separation of powers
between coordinate branches of government in civil law countries).
193. James F. Smith, Comments on NAFTA and the Trade in Agricultural Products, I U.S. -
MEx. L.J. 287, n.32 (1993).
194. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text (explaining the grant of authority given
to the LFCE).
195. BAKER, supra note 182, at 197-250 (discussing amparo procedures); HERoERT & CAMIL,
supra note 102, at 27-28 (discussing the amparo system).
196. See Zamora, supra note 50, at 440 ("Private sector controlled through system of family
and personal alliances.").
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ministrative investigations, the Commission decided to require that
the parties sign consent decrees, rather than impose administrative
fines. 
9 7
Centralized administrative enforcement of the Competition Law
however raises the potentially acute danger that the administrative
authority - the Commission - selectively will enforce the law. In
fact, this issue arises frequently with respect to administrative en-
forcement of the law in Mexico. In the not-too-distant past, Mexi-
can administrative entities enjoyed unbridled discretionary power
selectively to enforce legal requirements against individuals or
firms.'98 The bureaucratic structure for administrative enforcement
in Mexico was tailor-made for the extension of political favors and
other forms of corruption.
The architects of the Commission, however, have sought to mini-
mize the likelihood of such corruption by keeping the commission
and its members relatively insulated from the political whims of the
Executive Branch. Commissioners serve ten-year terms (four years
longer than the President). 199 Additionally, the Commission has a
budget independent of any other federal agency. °00 Thus, unlike all
other administrative bureaucracies,20' the Commission enjoys sub-
stantial political autonomy, and, by most accounts, has enforced the
LFCE in an even-handed fashion.
Indeed, one may view the Commission as a paradigm for adminis-
trative agency operations in Mexico. After decades of endemic cor-
ruption in administrative agencies, 202 the establishment of an inde-
pendent Competition Commission creates an opportunity to
legitimize administrative procedure as a fair, viable means of en-
forcing legal rights in Mexico. The fact that the Commission's pur-
view extends over both the public and private sectors adds to its
potential to effect change in Mexico beyond the arena of commer-
cial competition alone.
197. See Annual Report, supra note 56, at 19-22 (briefly describing the Commission's investi-
gations of bank credit cards and gasoline stations and the respective consent agreements entered
into with the major companies in those markets).
198. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text (discussing the past discretionary powers
held by administrative offices).
199. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 27.
200. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 5.
201. The environmental enforcement agency, SEDESOL, for example, operates completely
within the Executive Branch for budgeting, management and operational purposes.
202. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text (discussing the history of power abuse by
administrative agencies in Mexico).
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IV. THE COMMISSION'S FIRST YEAR
The decisions of the Commission are not published. In fact, the
sole source of information regarding the Commission's activity in
this area is the Annual Report of the Federal Competition Commis-
sion released in July 1994. While the cases reviewed in the Annual
Report are not binding,203 they offer valuable information regarding
the Commission's enforcement actions and policy objectives during
its first year in existence. At the same time, it is important to under-
score the limitations that this scarcity of documentation imposes on
conducting a thorough analysis. Not only is the Annual Report but
a single document, but it contains only case summaries drafted and
published by the Commission itself. Thus, the Report elaborates the
Commission's own interpretation and analysis of cases and events.
A. Monopolistic Practices
During the Commission's first year, only twenty-two private party
complaints alleging monopolistic practices were filed. 04 The Com-
mission has reviewed seventeen of these complaints, dismissing six-
teen of them on the grounds that they failed to meet the "minimum
conceptual and legal requirements. ' ' 20 5 The Commission has ob-
served that the legal community in Mexico generally is unfamiliar
with the provisions of the new law. 06 As lawyers and firms operat-
ing in Mexico gain familiarity with the provisions of the Competi-
tion Law, it is expected that a greater number of well-founded com-
plaints of anticompetitive conduct will be brought before the
Commission.0 7
While private parties were neither very active nor successful in
initiating claims under the LFCE, the Commission itself investi-
gated 16 cases of monopolistic market practices.2 0 8 These investiga-
tions - referred to as "ex-officio" cases - resulted in fines and
consent decrees in important economic sectors. 2 9 A few examples of
the Commission's decisions help to illustrate the Commission's focus
203. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 26, 30.
204. Id. at 24.
205. The Commission may dismiss complaints that are "notoriously inadmissible." LFCE,
supra note 1, art. 32.
206. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 4.
207. See id. at 4, 24.
208. Id. at 19.
209. See infra notes 210-37 and accompanying text.
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and activities.
In Investigation re Auctions of Treasury Certificates of the Fed-
eration, the Commission decided to investigate the bidding practices
of several large financial houses210 in the weekly auctions of federal
treasury certificates, or tesobonos.21 The Commission discovered
that these financial houses had "coordinated" their bids in several
auctions during 1993, thus obtaining the certificates at a discount
rate.2"2 The Commission concluded that this bid-rigging was "in-
compatible" with the LFCE, and imposed fines on each financial
house.213
In another investigation of a price-fixing conspiracy, Investigation
re Laundries and Dry Cleaners, the Commission examined the laun-
dry and dry cleaning prices charged by several ostensibly competing
companies and the participation of two trade associations in estab-
lishing those rates.21 4 The Commission concluded that the National
Chamber of Laundry Industries and the National Association of
Professional Cleaners printed, sold and distributed among their
members lists of the rates and prices the companies should charge to
the public. 218 The Commission enjoined the practice and assessed
fines against the trade organizations, and two dry cleaning busi-
nesses.21 6 The Commission emphasized that "chambers and business
associations must avoid facilitating unlawful information exchanges
among their members. 217
The Commission chose not to levy significant fines against firms
during the first year, imposing less than $800,000 for all enforce-
ment actions. 218 This may change this year as the Commission be-
comes less tolerant of firms' ignorance - real or purported - of
the requirements of the new law.2 19 However, at least in its first
year, the Commission did not use its fining authority as a major
210. These financial houses included Grupo Bursatil Mexicano, Casa de Bolsa, Banco Nacional
de Mexico, Operadora de Bolsa Serfin, Grupo Financiero Probursa, Banco Internacional, and








218. See Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Managing Free Competition in Mexico, THE RECORDER,
Aug. 29, 1994, at 7.
219. Interview with Commissioner of the Federal Competition Commission, Dr. Leonel Per-
eznieto Castro (Jan. 31, 1995).
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enforcement tool. Rather, the Commission employed broad consent
decrees to enforce the LCEF.2 20 Two traditionally restricted mar-
kets, the credit card market and gasoline station franchising, are
examples.
In Investigation re Bank Credit Cards, the Commission investi-
gated the participation of Mexico's three largest banks in the "coor-
dination" of their credit card operations. 2 ' Several factors
prompted the Commission's investigation: the fees paid by
merchants for credit card transactions appeared to be higher than
the average paid in foreign markets; the credit card transaction fees
and the interest rates charged by the leading banks were nearly
identical; and the profit margins on credit card operations were
higher in Mexico than in any other country, and higher than profits
on other bank products.22 Upon examining the credit card industry
in other countries, the Commission found that an independent struc-
ture exists among card-issuing banks, member banks and payment
systems.2 23 This structure permitted each bank independently to es-
tablish transaction fees and other credit card-related charges.224 In
Mexico, on the other hand, no clear distinction existed between the
credit card-issuing bank, the affiliate banks and the interbank pay-
ment network, thus facilitating the "coordination" of interest rates
and transaction fees among the banks. 25
As a result of the Commission's investigation, the Mexican banks
signed a consent decree (convenio de coordinacion) requiring them
to cease anticompetitive business practices in the credit card mar-
ket. 26 Specifically, the banks agreed to eliminate the exchange of
any information that may have the object or effect of setting uni-
form bank commissions or interest rates.22 ' The banks further
agreed to eliminate any contractual prohibitions on cash purchase
discounts by merchants.22 8 The consent agreement promotes eco-
nomic efficiency because transaction fees will be more consistent
220. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 3-4.
221. These banks were Bancomer, Banamex and Banco Serfin. Id. at 20.
222. Id. at 19.
223. Id. at 19-20.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 20.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The Commission reports that these changes should result in lower bank commission rates,
increased flexibility for the more than 250,000 establishments linked to the credit card system,
and lower interest rates for over 15 million credit cardholders in Mexico. Id. at 20-21.
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with banks' costs and merchants will have more flexibility in their
pricing policies. 2 Over 15 million credit cardholders in Mexico are
expected to benefit from the consent decree."O
Another significant Commission investigation resulting in a major
consent decree involved Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the govern-
ment-owned oil monopoly. " 1 PEMEX and public utilities like
Telmex and the Federal Electricity Commission generally are ex-
empt from the provisions of the Competition Law, as are other con-
stitutionally protected "strategic activities. 23 2 But the activities of a
public enterprise may fall within the scope of the Law if the activity
is not deemed "strategic. '"233 The Commission concluded that the
activities of Pemex-Refinacion, a subsidiary of Pemex, fell within
the scope of the LFCE.2 4 The Commission investigated Pemex's re-
strictions over the franchising of gasoline stations, the number of
gasoline stations permitted in any given geographic area, and the
products authorized for sale at gas stations. 2 6 As a result of the
Commission's investigation, Pemex signed a consent decree requir-
ing, among other things, the preparation of new "Rules for the Es-
tablishment and Operation of Service Stations" eliminating many of
these restrictions. 36 The Commission predicts that the consent de-
cree will create many more service station franchising opportunities
throughout Mexico. It also predicts that increased competition in




Especially because of the dramatic economic reforms of the past
decade, the competitive impact of a corporate merger or acquisition
in the Mexican market cannot easily be determined. For example,
many firms may find that they suffer from structural inefficiencies,
and cannot compete effectively under Mexico's new market condi-
tions. Many of these firms have merged with competing firms, seem-
229. Id. at 20.
230. Id. at 21.
231. Id. at 21-22.





237. Id. at 22.
1182 [Vol. 44:1149
MEXICO'S ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK
ingly to obtain efficiencies sufficient to compete in global markets.
Recognizing that the national economy is in a state of extraordinary
restructuring, the Commission appears to be developing a flexible
approach to its review of mergers and acquisitions.238
The Commission unconditionally approved 39 mergers; in the re-
maining cases, the Commission imposed conditions on the transac-
tions "to eliminate the possible anticompetitive effects of their trans-
action. ' 23 9 Additionally, the Commission evaluated the bidding
procedures in connection with the sale of seven state-owned entities
"to prevent the divestiture process from becoming a vehicle for mo-
nopolistic mergers.
240
The Commission has developed a three-step analysis to evaluate
merger cases. In each merger case, the Commission begins its analy-
sis by defining the relevant market for substitute goods and ser-
vices.' 41 The Commission considers "product characteristics, their
geographic location and the ease of access to the product and its
substitutes. ' 242 For example, in a merger review case called Con-
sorcio Integral de Empresas, S.A. de C. V. with Xafra S.A. de C. V.,
the Commission assessed a proposed merger involving nine sugar
mills, accounting for 48 % of the national market for refined sugar
production.2 43 Defining the relevant market as the domestic refined
sugar market, the Commission concluded that "it was unlikely" that
the firm resulting from the merger would be able to exercise sub-
stantial power in the relevant market.24 The Commission reasoned
that significant substitutes were available in the event that the new
firm tried to dominate the market.245 Most significantly, the Com-
mission noted that NAFTA substantially liberalized maize produc-
tion, which is the principal ingredient of high fructose syrup, a
"close substitute" for refined sugar as an input for soft drinks.246
Although the Commission approved the merger, the Commission or-
dered, "with preventive purposes in mind," the new company to re-
port all future purchases of sugar-related companies or assets, even
238. Id. at 30.
239. Id. at 7.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 16-17.
242. Id. at 17.
243. Id. at 7-8.
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if those transactions fell below the statutory thresholds for
notification.2""
The Commission considers additional factors to provide a context
for assessing the net effect of a merger. For example, the Commis-
sion considers entry barriers, import conditions, costs of transporta-
tion, and the recent conduct of the merging parties.248 If the Com-
mission concludes that the parties do not possess substantial market
power in the relevant market, it will not challenge the merger.249
In several cases, the Commission found that the merging partners
possessed high market shares, but that the firms' substantial power
in the market was offset by economic efficiencies.25 In Banco Union,
S.A. with Grupo Financiero Cremi, S.A. de C.V., for example, the
Commission approved the merger of two large banks, specifically
noting that establishing larger banks was an appropriate strategy
"to face competition from foreign banks" as a result of NAFTA.2 5,
Likewise, in IUSACELL, S.A. de C.V. with Telecom. del Golfo, et
al., the Commission approved the merger of several companies pro-
viding cellular telephone services in Mexico.252 The Commission
stressed that the "strongest argument" for approving the merger
was that the merger would "create a national competitor for
Telcel," a TELMEX subsidiary.253 As the dominant firm in the
market, Telcel had been able to control major segments of the cellu-
lar telephone market, facing only small competitors. Thus, the pro-
posed merger was "likely to curb the [market] power of the main
existing competitor.
25 4
Because the pervasive restructuring of the Mexican economy has
247. Id.
248. Id. at 17.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 7-15. The Commission also has developed a new concentration index developed by a
member of the Commission, based in part on the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). The Com-
mission has modified the index to take into account the size of the merging firms relative to the
entire market: "This index is defined as the sum of the square of each company's share in total
supply, divided by Herfindahl's Index, and then raised to the second power. In general terms, this
index does not increase with mergers of relatively small companies, but does increase with mergers
of relatively large ones (given the size distribution of companies in a particular market.)." Id. at
33. This calculation yields what the Commission considers to be a "reliable" measure of the anti-
competitive potential of a merger. Id.
251. Id. at 11.
252. Id. at 8-10.
253. Id. at 9. TELMEX is the recently privatized national telecommunications monopoly.
Telcel, a subsidiary of TELMEX, enjoys an exclusive concession to operate cellular telephone
service on Band B, i.e., long distance cellular telephone service. See id.
254. Id. at 10.
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caused many companies to dramatically alter their operations, the
Commission has found it necessary to distinguish cases that involve
corporate reorganizations from actual mergers and acquisitions. In
particular, the Commission is studying possible criteria for evaluat-
ing whether a proposed transaction involves a concentracibn (i.e.,
merger or acquisition) or a corporate reorganization.255 The LFCE
defines a "concentraci6n" as any "merger, or acquisition of control
or an other act whereby companies, partnerships, shares, equity,
trusts or assets in general are concentrated among competitors, sup-
pliers, customers or any other economic agent." '256 At present, the
Commission evaluates the equity structure before and after a pro-
posed transaction to evaluate whether the transaction is simply oper-
ational, i.e., a corporate reorganization or a concentration subject to
the LFCE. 57 If the Commission concludes that the transaction does
not involve "any change in the actual control of the companies in-
volved," then the transaction is deemed to be a corporate reorgani-
zation, not subject to the notification provisions of the law. 25 8
C. Potential Obstacles To Enforcement
The Commission faces at least four substantial obstacles to vigor-
ous enforcement of the Competition Law in Mexico. First, antitrust
is a fairly novel development in Mexican law.25 9 Even as firms and
lawyers gain familiarity with the LFCE, a "litigation explosion" in
the antitrust area is not likely. As a civil law jurisdiction, Mexico
has not allowed private litigants broad access to the courts or ad-
ministrative agencies in order to enforce individual rights. 2 0 To the
contrary, Mexico's legal system is abundant with multiple proce-
dural obstacles that effectively curtail private party access to the
court system. 2 ' Mexican statutes generally do not create a private
cause of action for enforcement of rights under the law. The LFCE
is no exception. Consequently, private parties must pursue a Writ of
255. To facilitate merger notification, the Commission has prepared a questionnaire, available
to the public, upon request to the Commission's correspondence office. See id. at 15.
256. LFCE, supra note 1, art. 16.
257. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 16.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing Mexico's first antitrust statute).
260. See generally BAKER, supra note 182, at 111-12 (explaining that amparo is limited to the
first twenty-nine articles of the constitution); HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 102, at 27-28 (ex-
plaining the restrictions on the juicio de amparo, or writ of protection).
261. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural barriers to the
courts).
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Amparo to challenge governmental actions.262 Amparo suits, how-
ever, are difficult to bring because the plaintiff must allege a consti-
tutional violation of rights, and establish actual individualized
harm. 6 ' Equally important, amparo suits involve relatively complex
and lengthy procedures, thus making the action extraordinarily
costly. Due in part to these judicial and regulatory barriers, Mexi-
cans generally do not use the court system or administrative
processes to enforce legal rights.
Moreover, Mexico does not follow the doctrine of stare decisis.2"'
Courts and administrative agencies generally do not recognize prior
decisions or rulings as binding precedent.2 65 Only the party whose
conduct is challenged is bound by the decision of a court or adminis-
trative body.266 Therefore, the Commission's decision in one case.
does not lessen the burden of enforcing the law in an analogous case
involving a different party. Also, the Mexican code of civil proce-
dure does not allow class actions. As a result, many victims of anti-
trust would not recover enough to make litigation financially
worthwhile.
Finally, and perhaps most important, vigorous enforcement of the
LFCE confronts daunting political barriers. The largest conglomer-
ates in Mexico maintain close ties to the government, and are able
to retaliate if challenged by less powerful competitors.26 For exam-
ple, Mexico's entertainment giant, Televisa, enjoys close to 90 per-
cent of Mexico's television audience and wields enormous power
over economic and political developments in the country.26 8 Televisa
262. See supra notes 182-87 (discussing Writs of Amparo).
263. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
264. Stare decisis is the familiar common law doctrine of courts basing new decisions on the
holdings of prior cases. MERRYMAN, supra note 188, at 22. "Adherence to precedent [stare deci-
sis] promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority." Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 563-64 (1991).
265. See MERRYMAN, supra note 187, at 23-24 (recognizing "custom" as acceptable only as
long as there is no applicable statute or regulation to the contrary). However, due in part to the
influence of U.S. legal culture, the Mexican courts have adopted a doctrine of precedent called
"jurisprudentia." Under the doctrine of jurisprudentia, the rulings of the Mexican Supreme Court
of Justice constitute jurisprudentia when the Court has decided five consecutive cases on a specific
legal issue in a like manner. See EARL WEISBAU, MEXICO: A LEGAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE
(1990).
266. See HERGERT & CAMIL, Supra note 102, at 77 (stating that there is no "formal require-
ment" for courts to follow prior precedents but noting, however, that courts are likely to decide
similar cases the same way).
267. Elisabeth Malkin, Busting Trusts - Commission's Soft Approach May Change After the




is a major source of revenue for the government, paying nearly $100
million in television concession in 1992 alone.2 69 The Commission
has been sharply criticized for not investigating Televisa and its an-
ticompetitive business practices.2 70 Among Televisa's suspect busi-
ness practices are exclusive dealing contracts with television per-
formers, and pernicious control of advertisement rates in the
television industry.27'
The Commission has acknowledged that it operates with substan-
tial limitations. In its Annual Report, the Commission recognizes
that, "lack of a vigorous competition policy in the past has led to an
overly concentrated industrial structure" enabling firms to continue
anticompetitive practices. 7 2 Most problematic for the work of the
Commission is the fact that many exclusive or long-term govern-
ment concessions, in telecommunications and other important sec-
tors, preceded the enactment of the Competition Law and thus are
grandfathered .1 7  The Commission acknowledges that these conces-
sions, have produced a "negative effect on efficiency and equity for
many years to come.
274
In fact, the Commission underscores that its enforcement in this
area is a poor substitute for proper government regulations:
Unless the regulatory authorities coordinate their actions with those of the
competition authorities, the [Commission's] efforts will not yield the ex-
pected results. It is very important that regulatory authorities abstain from
issuing rulings, orders or other types of provisions which restrict the entry of
new competitors or create exclusive advantages for a select group. In the
future it will be increasingly important to incorporate competition criteria in
the regulatory authorities' conduct, and in the concession and permit-grant-
ing processes.
7
The Commission, in effect, has warned government officials that it
will not tolerate a continuation of the old policy of using regulatory
processes to grant favors or advantages to a "select group. '2 76 As in
the Iusacell case, 77 the Commission appears willing to take defini-
tive action to strip away anticompetitive, and exclusive, advantages
269. Id.
270. Id. at 19.
271. Id.
272. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 14.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 5.
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 252-54 and accompanying text (describing the lusacell case).
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granted to dominant firms by the government.
D. Key Issues Of Interpretation Of The LFCE
The LFCE draws a fundamental distinction between relative mo-
nopolistic practices and absolute monopolistic practices. This statu-
tory distinction raises important legal and practical issues of
interpretation.
1. The Per Se Bar on Absolute Monopolistic Practices
Mexico's adoption of a per se rule of illegality for absolute mo-
nopolistic practices highlights an important competition policy deci-
sion: business practices falling within the per se category will be
condemned automatically, without regard to the actual economic ef-
fect of, or business justification for, the market conduct.2 78 One of
the most difficult tasks the Commission may face will be deciding
how properly to "label" a challenged market practice. Determining
when the per se rule ought to apply is not a simple task. United
States courts have struggled for years to strike a balance in applying
the per se rule.279 Despite their benefits, e.g., promoting certainty
and possibly deterrence, per se rules have produced substantial con-
fusion in United States antitrust jurisprudence. 80
By neatly dividing practices into "absolute monopolistic prac-
tices," subject to the per se rule, and "relative monopolistic prac-
tices," subject to rule of reason, the Competition Law creates the
danger that the rule of automatic illegality will be applied to other-
wise desirable market arrangements. 28' For example, a market ar-
rangement where price-fixing may be only ancillary to a perfectly
legal distribution arrangement may be found per se illegal, despite
economic efficiency justifications. 2  In contrast, under United States
278. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 18 (1978) (defining the rational of the per se
rule); see also supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text (discussing the per se rule).
279. BORK, supra note 278, at 267-79 (describing the U.S. Supreme Courts' struggle in apply-
ing the per se rule to case law).
280. See id. at 263 (discussing confusion in application of the per se rule to an agreement that
is not ancillary to cooperative productive activity).
281. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 124-34 (1985)
(creating categories of market conduct that may or may not violate the antitrust laws is
problematic).
282. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the per se
rule and the contextual problems that the rule creates); see also United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388
U.S. 350, 355-58 (1967) (holding a restraint of the resale price of a trademarked article cannot be
defended as ancillary to a trademark licensing scheme and set manufacture's fixing of retail price
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antitrust law, such an arrangement may be valid where the price-
fixing arrangement serves an economic efficiency purpose.288 Under
the LFCE, however, a firm defending such a practice barred from
presenting any pro-competitive justifications for the practice.
This concern is heightened by Mexico's civil law tradition. In civil
code systems, written law (i.e., statutes, codes) carries much more
weight than historical or common law.284 Judges generally strictly
apply statutes, leaving themselves little room for judicial interpreta-
tion.2 85 Thus, laws in civil law systems must be more specific than
those in common law jurisdictions.2 88  However, the LFCE contains
no guidance regarding how the per se rule ought to be applied,
which party has the burden of proof, or how much evidence of a per
se violation the Commission will require before applying the pre-
sumption of illegality. The Commission recognizes the need for reg-
ulations in this, and other, areas. 8 The Commission intends to sub-
mit draft regulations to Congress for approval by September
1995.288 These regulations, among other things, should clarify how
the per se rule will be applied in practice, not simply in theoretical
terms.289
The codification of specific offenses as per se illegal has no ana-
logue under United States antitrust legislation. In fact, the present
antitrust approach in the United States reflects a clear retreat from
strict adherence to the per se labeling approach of the past.290 In
was "so serious that courts will not pause to assess them in light of the rule of reason").
283. See, e.g., N.C.A.A. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okl., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (hold-
ing that when analyzing trade under the rule of reason test, the inquiry is confined to a considera-
tion of impact on competitive conditions); BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (stating that
procompetitive benefits in restrictive broadcast licensing agreements justified a rule of reason anal-
ysis); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226-27 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (noting that agency exclusivity is "economically beneficial" in some circumstances, and that
the van line's decision to terminate the contract of the agent with interstate authority was not per
se illegal).
284. See MERRYMAN, supra note 189, at 26-29 (describing the civil code system "not as a form
of expression but as the expression of an ideology.").
285. Id. at 35 (portraying the civil law judge as a civil servant who performs important but
essentially uncreative functions).
286. Id. at 32.
287. Interview with Comm'r Pereznieto, supra note 219.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. A rigid application of the per se label would be inconsistent with the present antitrust
approach in the U.S. U.S. courts increasingly have departed from the labeling approach in anti-
trust, focusing instead on whether the practice promotes economic efficiency or competition. See,
e.g., Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1567-69 (11 th Cir. 1991) (applying
the per se test, with caution, "only when history and analysis have shown that in sufficiently
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recent years, the Supreme Court has warned against formalistic
line-drawing between those practices that presumably are per se il-
legal and those that merit a full rule of reason analysis. 9 1 In es-
sence, the per se rule is now only applied with respect to business
practices that, based on experience in the marketplace have proved
to be almost always anticompetitive. 2
In Mexico, no such experience of judicial or administrative evalu-
ation of the economic effect of trade restraints exists. The Commis-
sion therefore will rely, in some measure, on the experience of the
United States and other jurisdictions concerning specific business
practices. Three of the Commissioners have travelled to the FTC
and the DOJ to study how United States antitrust law is enforced in
this country. Also, the Commission recently subscribed to LEXIS in
order to have immediate access to United States enforcement ac-
tions and judicial opinions on antitrust.9
At a more practical level, Mexico's decision to codify a per se rule
may have been motivated by a desire strictly to enforce the law
against the most flagrant anticompetitive business practices. In light
of the extent of industrial concentration in the national economy,
and the prevalence of anticompetitive business practices in many
sectors, the per se rule may serve to focus the Commission's enforce-
ment efforts in those areas where national firms continue to enjoy
some protection from international competition.29 4 Through vigorous
application of the per se rule, therefore, the Commission can con-
centrate its limited resources investigating the most egregious mar-
ket practices.2 98 The Commission has indicated a clear policy to
pursue anticompetitive practices especially in those markets that re-
similar circumstances the rule of reason unequivocally results in a finding of liability"); Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply
per se rule to policy of van line carrier to terminate agents competing with the company).
291. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. University of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 90
(1984) ("[TIhe essential inquiry ... is whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competi-
tion"); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) ("[A]ny 'departure'
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than
... upon formalistic line drawing.").
292. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 298 (1985) (declaring that "the act of expulsion from a wholesale cooperative does not raise
a probability of anticompetitive effect").
293. Interview with Comm'r Pereznieto, supra note 219.
294. See Annual Report, supra note 56, at 4 (stating that the Commission will focus on those
sectors that traditionally have not been exposed to international competition).
295. See id. at 4-5 (noting the Commission's change in focus).
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main insulated to some extent from international competition.296
2. The Rule of Reason and Relative Monopolistic Practices
Apart from the per se rule, the Competition Law adopts an analy-
sis substantially similar to the rule of reason analysis employed in
United States antitrust law.297 Articles 10 through 13 of the Com-
petition Law provide that "relative monopolistic practices" are vio-
lations of the law only if the alleged offender has "substantial mar-
ket power" in the "relevant market."2 98 The Competition Law
therefore adopts the two-step United States "rule of reason" analy-
sis which seeks to: (1) define the relevant market; and (2) measure
the defendant's power within the defined market. 99
In fact, the LFCE sets forth virtually the same criteria that
United States courts consider in defining the relevant market. As in
the United States, the LFCE focuses on two important factors that
generally define a relevant market under United States law -- the
availability of substitute goods or services (demand substitutability)
and the potential of securing supply from other areas (supply
substitutability). 300
United States courts also routinely examine the remaining criteria
found in the Competition Law, such as 1) the existence, participa-
tion and market power of competitors; 01 2) the existence of barriers
to entry into the market;302 3) the access of the defendant firm and
its competitors to critical raw materials or technology.303
Under Mexico's civil code system, legislation aims to be compre-
296. See generally id. (implying that the Commission passed the per se rule, at least in part, in
order to concentrate on insulated markets).
297. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of reason analysis).
298. Le de Invenciones y Marca, DIARIO OFFICIAL, Feb. 10, 1976.
299. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (citing United States rule of reason
caselaw).
300. See, e.g., Kodak v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (holding copying and
micrographic equipment manufacture had the market power to interfere with the availability of
independent service organizations in supplying equipment maintainence).
301. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (finding that the television industry was not oligopolistic wherein the industry had over 100
competing manufacturers), aff d 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982).
302. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 606 (1974) (stating that
commercial banking must take into account the regulatory restraints on entry into commerce).
303. But cf Monahan's Marine, Inc v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that the defendant's conduct "did not significantly change the structure of the ... mar-
ket"); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 725 F.2d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983) (illustrating
the "procompetitive" objective of the Robinson-Patman Act and how it protects competitors by
forbidding sellers to "discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities.").
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hensive, leaving the courts or administrative agencies with little or
no room to develop case law interpretations or doctrines.30 As a
result, common law concepts like "judge-made law" are not recog-
nized as playing a role in the formation and development of legal
doctrine and principles.30 5 Therefore, it is not surprising that there is
virtually no case law interpreting Mexico's 60-year old antitrust law
history.
3. Establishing Viable Legal Standards and Procedures
Given the civil law tradition in Mexico, it may be difficult for the
Commission or the Mexican courts to develop definitions and inter-
pretations that parties may depend on in rule of reason cases.306 In
each case, the Commission must determine how the relevant market
is defined and whether a firm possesses substantial power in that
market. These common law concepts are essentially legal creations
that have evolved over the course of thousands of American anti-
trust decisions.
Despite these limitations, the Commission, as a non-judicial body,
may have greater freedom to develop "common law-type" jurispru-
dence than would the courts in Mexico. For example, the Commis-
sion is studying the possibility of developing guidelines on the ques-
tion of market definition and market power assessment.
Additionally, the Commission is free to look at foreign sources of
antitrust for guidance on the many complex legal issues that it will
face in interpreting the LFCE.
Inevitably, the Commission also will play a significant role in con-
structing the legal and procedural building blocks for the litigation
process in the new competition law regime. Given the minor role of
private party litigation in antitrust disputes, many crucial elements
of the litigation system remain relatively undefined. Although the
examples which could be cited in the area of competition law alone
are almost innumerable, an illustration of the point would be help-
ful. For example, essential to a finding of an absolute or relative
monopolistic practice will be proof of the existence of an "agree-
304. See MERRYMAN, supra note 189, at 26-29 (recognizing that if "the legislature alone could
make laws and the judiciary could only apply them . such legislation had to be complete,
coherent, and clear.").
305. Id. at 36-37 (identifying the judges' image as "an operator of a machine designed and
built by legislator.").
306. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing Mexican court's traditional role as
appliers of the law, rather than as interpreters).
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ment" among ostensibly competing entities. Under present Mexican
law, it is far from clear what evidence will be required to substanti-
ate a finding of such an agreement. Indeed, it is even uncertain
which party would have the burden of proof in a Commission pro-
ceeding. °7 Moreover, because Mexico does not have civil discovery
procedures, it is not clear precisely what kind of inquiry the Com-
mission, much less a private litigant, may pursue in seeking to prove
an antitrust violation. As it interprets and enforces the new Compe-
tition Law, the Commission will need to address these basic proce-
dural and substantive questions.
V. COMPETITION POLICY AND THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
The increasing economic integration of North America presents
significant new opportunities for coordinating a competition policy
among the member states - Canada, Mexico and the United
States. 30 8 NAFTA is a comprehensive agreement intended 1) to
eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate cross-border movement
of, goods and services among the Parties; 2) to promote fair compe-
tition within the free trade area; 3) to increase investment opportu-
nities within the trade area; 4) to provide adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights; 5) to create effective pro-
cedures for application of the Agreement, including dispute resolu-
tion procedures; and 6) to establish the basis for further trilateral,
regional and multilateral cooperation to enhance the benefits of
NAFTA.3 0 9 Each chapter in the Agreement is designed to imple-
ment one or more of these central goals.
Competition policy stands as an integral component of NAFTA.
Chapter 15 of NAFTA, entitled "Competition Policy, Monopolies
and State Enterprises," contains the Agreement's provisions relating
to competition policy in the free trade area.3 10 NAFTA's competi-
tion law provisions establish a basic framework for effective compe-
tition law enforcement in North America. Article 1501(1) provides
that the Parties shall "adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-
competitive business conduct and take appropriate actions with re-
307. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text (discussing Commission procedures).
308. NAFTA, supra note 3, prmbl.
309. Id. art. 102.
310. Id. art. 15.
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spect thereto."31' Article 1501(2) commits the Parties to "recog-
nize[] the importance of cooperation and coordination among their
authorities"; and, further, that the Parties shall "cooperate on issues
of competition law enforcement policy, including mutual assistance,
notification, consultation and exchange of information relating to
the enforcement of competition laws and policies in the free trade
area."
31 2
As the national economies of the three NAFTA countries become
more integrated, antitrust enforcement agencies in each nation will
face a broad range of situations where interagency cooperation may
be necessary. Enhanced cooperation and coordination may be pro-
moted through executive agreements or memoranda of understand-
ing ("MOU") that now are quite common in the antitrust area." 3
The United States has MOUs with Canada,1 4 the European Com-
munity,3 15 Germany3 16 and Australia.1 7 Canada and the United
States also are signatories to the 1986 OECD Recommendation re-
garding cooperation between member states on restrictive business
practices affecting international trade.318 Cooperation may also be
improved through GATT and the World Trade Organization. There
have already been attempts to hasten the convergence of antitrust
policy, as well as regulation of anticompetitive practices (e.g, subsi-
dies and dumping) through GATT. 1 9 Though currently resisted by
a number of nations, this trend will no doubt continue.
To extend cooperation principles to include Mexico, the existing
MOU between Canada and the United States may be "trilateral-
311. Id. art. 1501(1).
312. Id. art. 1501(2).
313. Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with
Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1994.
314. Id.
315. Agreement Between the Commission of the European Communities and the Government
of the United States of America Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 22,
1991.
316. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, June 23, 1976.
317. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Australia Concerning Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982.
318. U.S., Canada Agree on Procedure for Cooperation and Antitrust Probes, 46 ANTITRUST
ANd TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1156, at 524 (Mar. 15, 1984) (highlighting the agreement's
notice and consultation requirements as encouraging both governments to assist each other in
antitrust enforcement).
319. GARY N. HORLICK AND MICHAEL A. MEYER, The International Convergence of Competi-
tion Policy, 29 THE INT'L LAWYER 65-76 (Spr. 1995).
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ized." A trilateral arrangement would promote cooperation among
the three countries' enforcement agencies and would help to avoid
disputes in international antitrust enforcement.3 0 MOU's and other
international cooperation arrangements provide an institutional set-
ting for consultation between antitrust authorities. Frequent consul-
tation among authorities in Canada, the United States and Mexico
in turn should lead to a greater understanding of each countries'
unique approach and policy priorities in the area of antitrust. 21
Mexico's new Competition Law creates the foundation for more
complementary antitrust application and enforcement in North
America. The Commission recognizes the central role of NAFTA
and other trade agreements in gaining broad support for a new com-
petition policy in Mexico. 22 The enactment of a Competition Law
in Mexico, and the ratification of NAFTA present a unique oppor-
tunity in North America to maximize coordination of the respective
competition policies of the NAFTA countries.323
VI. CONCLUSION
Antitrust in Mexico is a broad, and potentially dynamic, new area
of law and government policy. Antitrust/competition policy likely
will undergo significant evolution in the short term as the Commis-
sion develops standards and rules for interpretation and enforcement
of the 1992 Competition Law. Decades of direct government inter-
vention in the national economy, promotion of state and private mo-
nopolies, and import substitution policies have combined to create
an overly concentrated and oligopolistic market in Mexico. This sit-
uation makes effective competition law enforcement difficult, if not
impossible. However, the Commission is engaged in a valiant effort
to apply the law in critical sectors of the Mexican economy. By
most accounts, the Commission has been quite successful in sending
a clear message to firms in Mexico that the Competition Law will
be vigorously enforced. 24
320. For a thorough discussion of the competition issues raised by NAFTA, see Report of the
Task Force of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association on the Competition Dimen-
sion of the NAFTA (July 20, 1994).
321. Id.
322. Annual Report, supra note 56, at 1 (declaring that foreign trade liberalization and "re-
cently signed free trade agreements" have increased competition in many markets).
323. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 102(1).
324. Malkin, supra note 267, at 18 (describing the Commission's success battling the banks,
dry cleaning, communications and transportation industries).
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With the LFCE, Mexico has an opportunity to develop a trans-
parent and efficient legal framework to promote free competition for
all market participants. The close relationship that has developed
between the Competition Commission and the United States Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Justice Department will potentially
lead to increasing cooperation between the two countries' authorities
on competition law issues, exchange of non-confidential information,
merger review and substantive rules and standards. These relation-
ships certainly will play a major role in evaluating the increasing
trans-border transactions affecting both Mexico and the United
States.
As in other areas, the strains and limited resources of the newly-
constituted Commission to conduct thorough and well-founded in-
vestigations will be an important issue. As important, the credibility
of the Commission's findings and decisions will be subject to intense
scrutiny in the short term as the Commission establishes itself as
Mexico's most significant enforcement agency. Vigorous enforce-
ment of Mexico's new Competition Law will depend, in large mea-
sure, on the integrity, consistency and credibility of the Commis-
sion's decision-making process.
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